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Abstract
Human beings want to believe that good outcomes in the future are more likely,
but also want to make good decisions that increase average outcomes in the future.
We consider a general equilibrium model with complete markets and show that when
investors hold beliefs that optimally balance these two incentives, portfolio holdings
and asset prices match six observed patterns: (i) because the cost of biased beliefs are
typically second-order, investors typically hold biased assessments of probabilities and
so are not perfectly diversi¯ed according to objective metrics; (ii) because the costs of
biased beliefs temper these biases, the utility cost of the lack of diversi¯cation are lim-
ited; (iii) because there is a complementarity between believing a state more likely and
purchasing more of the asset that pays o® in that state, investors over-invest in only
one Arrow-Debreu security and smooth their consumption well across the remaining
states; (iv) because di®erent households can settle on di®erent states to be optimistic
about, optimal portfolios of ex ante identical investors can be heterogeneous; (v) be-
cause low-price and low-probability states are the cheapest states to buy consumption
in, overoptimism about these states distorts consumption the least in the rest of the
states, so that investors tend to overinvest in the most skewed securities; (vi) ¯nally, be-
cause investors with optimal expectations have higher demand for more skewed assets,
ceteris paribus, more skewed asset can have lower average returns.
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1This paper studies portfolio holdings and asset prices in an economy in which people's
natural tendency to be optimistic about the payout from their investments is tempered by
the ex post costs of basing their portfolio decisions on incorrect beliefs. We show that this
model can generate the following three stylized facts.
First, households' portfolios are not optimally diversi¯ed according to various theoretical-
based measures (Marshall E. Blume et al. (1974), William N. Goetzmann and Alok Kumar
(2001) , Laurent E. Calvet et al. (2006), Stephanie Curcuru et al. (forthcoming)). The costs
of this lack of diversi¯cation appear to be modest. Most households hold a well-diversi¯ed
portfolio of mutual funds and also a signi¯cant amount of one or two additional stocks.1
Second, and part of the evidence for the ¯rst fact, household portfolios are tilted to-
wards stocks with identi¯able attributes, and in particular towards holdings of individual
stocks with positive skewness. Further, undiversi¯ed households hold individual stocks that
have relatively high idiosyncratically skewed returns and their portfolios have relatively high
idiosyncratically skewed returns (Todd Mitton and Keith Vorkink (forthcoming)).
Finally, positively skewed assets tend to have lower returns. This is true for stocks in the
US stock market in general (Yijie Zhang (2005)) as well as for speci¯c well-studied examples,
such as the value-growth premium and the long-run underperformance of IPOs.2
This paper argues that these three patterns are observed because human beings both
want to believe what makes them happier and want to make good decisions that lead to
good outcomes in the future. We consider an exchange economy with two periods and
complete markets in which households with log utility invest in the ¯rst period and consume
in the second period. We show that these patterns arise in this economy when investors
hold beliefs that optimally trade-o® the ex ante bene¯ts of anticipatory utility against the
1Further, and complementary evidence for our purposes, household income risk is not fully-insured by
households across groups of households, where moral-hazard would seem an implausible reason for this failure
(Orazio Attanasio and Steven J. Davis (1996)).
2There is also complementary evidence from gambling behavior. Lotteries are highly skewed assets, and
the demand for lottery tickets rises with probability controlling for expected return. And, in parimutuel
betting on races, in which the bettors determine returns in equilibrium, long-shots have lower expected
returns than favorites.
1ex post costs of basing investment decisions on biased beliefs.
Our model of beliefs follows the optimal expectations framework of Markus K. Brun-
nermeier and Jonathan A. Parker (2005). We assume that people behave optimally given
their beliefs, choosing portfolios that maximize their expected present discounted value of
utility °ows.3 Because investors care about expected future utility °ows, they are happier
if they overestimate the probabilities of states of the world in which their investments pay
o® well. But such optimism would lead to suboptimal decision making, and lower levels of
utility on average ex post. Optimal beliefs trade-o® these competing forces: people's beliefs
maximize the objective expectation of their well-being, the average of their expected present
discounted value of utility °ows. This economic model of beliefs balances the anticipatory
bene¯ts of optimism against the costs of basing actions on distorted beliefs. Because the
costs of small deviations from optimal behavior are of second order, and the anticipatory
bene¯ts of biases in probabilities typically are of ¯rst-order, optimal subjective and objec-
tive probabilities di®er. Christian Gollier (2005) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) study
portfolio choice and asset prices in incomplete markets (and a two-state complete market
example). This paper derives a general characterization in a complete markets economy.
In terms of portfolios, we show in Section I that an investor with optimal expectations
does not fully diversify its portfolio but instead biases upwards (a lot) its subjective beliefs
about the likelihood of one state and biases downward (a little) its subjective beliefs about the
likelihood of all the remaining states. It does this because there is a natural complementarity
between believing a state more likely and purchasing more of the asset that pays o® in that
state. Once a state is perceived as more likely, one wants more consumption in that state, and
once one has more consumption in that state, one wants even more to believe that that state
is more likely. We further show that an investor chooses to be optimistic about the states
associated with the most skewed Arrow-Debreu securities: either the least expensive state
3Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) shows that di®erences in investor's self-reported beliefs about future
market returns (or internet stock returns) are highly signi¯cantly correlated with the share of their portfolio
in equities (or in internet stocks).
2(when states are equally likely) or the least likely state (when state prices are actuarially fair)
or the least expensive and least likely state when these coincide (in general). This happens
because low-price and low-probability states are the cheapest states to buy consumption
in, and so distort consumption in the rest of the states the least (for a given bias). Thus
portfolios are not perfectly diversi¯ed, households overinvest in the most skewed assets, and
household portfolios have positively skewed returns.
In general equilibrium, we show in Section II that investors tend to be optimistic about
di®erent states. Thus investors' portfolios have idiosyncratically skewed returns and con-
sumption insurance appears to be incomplete. In terms of asset prices, this preference for
skewed returns has price e®ects. Ceteris paribus, states with relatively small probabilities
tend to have relatively low expected returns.4
All proofs are contained in the appendix.
I. Portfolio choice with optimal expectations
The economy has two periods. There are S possible states of the world in period 2, with
state s having objective probability ¼s > 0. An investor with subjective beliefs ^ ¼s allocates
his wealth among a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities in the ¯rst period and consumes
the payo® from this portfolio in the second period. A person's investment choices, c =
fc1;c2;::;cSg, maximize his expected utility given his subjective beliefs, ^ ¼ = f^ ¼1; ^ ¼2;::; ^ ¼Sg:
V1 = max
c
XS
s=1 ^ ¼s ln(cs) subject to
XS
s=1 pscs = 1 and cs ¸ 0, (1)
4Nicholas C. Barberis and Ming Huang (2005) show that exogenous belief distortion as proposed by
Prospect Theory can lead to similar investment and price patterns. Gollier (2005) shows that in an incomplete
markets investment problem with a stock and a bond, optimal expectations imply that the investor biases
up the probability of the states in which the risky asset's returns are the highest and the lowest, as implied
by Prospect Theory. Thus, in this situation, overweighting extreme events is an endogenous outcome of the
trade-o® between the bene¯ts of anticipatory feelings and the suboptimality actual outcomes, rather than
being an exogenous characteristic of human beings.
3where ps > 0 is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security yielding one unit in state s, and
initial wealth is normalized to unity.5 Optimal portfolio choices exist and are unique:
c
¤
s (^ ¼) =
^ ¼s
ps
. (2)
Optimal beliefs. But what are the investor's subjective beliefs? One assumption is
that people hold rational expectations, an extreme assumption typically made both for its
tractability and for the discipline it provides. Further, the argument goes, since objective
beliefs lead to the best decisions and thus the highest average present discounted value of
utility, people have the incentive to acquire information and learn rationally so that their
beliefs should have a general tendency to converge to objective probabilities.
But in fact, rational beliefs do not lead to the highest expected present discounted value
of utility °ows. An investor can increase V1 by holding quite distorted beliefs, trading
on these, and then anticipating high average future utility. But biased beliefs come at a
cost. A person that makes objectively poor investment decisions has lower utility ex post,
V2 = lnc, on average. Our theory balances these e®ects { it trades o® the anticipatory
bene¯ts of optimism against the utility losses caused by decisions based on optimistic beliefs.
Further, this approach provides discipline: biases in beliefs are determined endogenously by
the economic environment.
Formally, each investor's beliefs maximize his well-being, de¯ned as the average expected
utility across periods 1 and 2 when actions are optimal given subjective beliefs. That is,
^ ¼ maximizes 1
2E [V1 + V2] subject to the constraints that the ^ ¼s are probabilities and that
portfolio choices are optimal given ^ ¼. This wellbeing function is similar to that proposed in
Andrew J. Caplin and John Leahy (2000), and analogous arguments support our use of this
5While here we assume ps > 0, Section II endogenizes prices and derives this as a result.
4function. Optimal beliefs maximize the Lagrangian
L =
PS
s=1 ^ ¼s lnc
¤
s (^ ¼) +
PS
s=1 ¼s lnc
¤
s (^ ¼) ¡ ¹
"
S X
s=1
^ ¼s ¡ 1
#
(3)
(and subject to ^ ¼s ¸ 0). Beliefs impact well-being directly through anticipation of future
°ow utility and indirectly through their e®ect on portfolio choice.6
Because c¤
s (^ ¼) is continuous in subjective probabilities, L is also; and since probability
spaces are compact, optimal beliefs exist. Further, if ^ ¼s = 0, c¤
s (^ ¼) = 0 and the investor
would get in¯nite negative utility if state s is realized.
Proposition 1: (Existence of interior optimal beliefs)
Optimal subjective probabilities, ^ ¼
¤, exist and are positive: 0 < ^ ¼
¤
s < 1 for all s.
Turning to the characterization of behavior, the ¯rst-order conditions for beliefs are
¼s
^ ¼s
¡ ln
¼s
^ ¼s
= ¹ ¡ 1 + ln
ps
¼s
for all s. (4)
And the second order conditions (reorganized) are
^ ¼s
·
1 ¡
¼s0
^ ¼s0
¸
· ^ ¼s0
·
¼s
^ ¼s
¡ 1
¸
for all s 6= s
0. (5)
The ¯rst-order conditions are displayed in Figure I.1, which plots the left-hand-side and
the right-hand-side of the equations against ¼s=^ ¼s. The left-hand-sides of the ¯rst-order
conditions are all identical convex curves with minima at objective beliefs, ^ ¼s = ¼s; the
right-hand-sides are horizontal lines, independent of beliefs, that are higher for states that
are more expensive per unit of probability. By Proposition 1, we know that ¹ is such that the
left-hand-side of each ¯rst-order condition intersects the right at least once (with 0 < ^ ¼s < 1
6This approach is a `frictionless extreme' in the sense that only ex-post costs limit biases in beliefs.
Additional factors might also constrain biases.
50 1 2 3
0
1
2
3
Left-hand
side
Right-hand sides
RE
Higher
price
Lower
price
Optimism Pessimism
Figure I.1: First-order conditions for optimal beliefs
for all s). Thus, each ¯rst-order condition has one or two solutions.7 If for state s, the
right-hand side equals one, then objective beliefs are the only possible solution. Otherwise,
the right-hand side is greater than one, and, by the concavity and linearity of the two sides,
there are two solutions to the ¯rst-order condition, one with a positive bias and one with
a negative bias. From the second-order condition if beliefs about the probability of s0 are
biased upwards, so that ¼s0=^ ¼s0 < 1, then ¼s=^ ¼s > 1 for all s 6= s0 so that beliefs about the
probabilities of all other states are biased downwards. Further analysis of the program shows
that objective beliefs are optimal beliefs only if S = 2 and ¼1 = ¼2 and p1 = p2.
Proposition 2: If S = 2 and ¼1 = ¼2 and p1 = p2, objective beliefs are optimal. Otherwise:
(i) one and only one state has upward-biased subjective probability, all other states have
downward-biased subjective probability: 9 s0 such that ^ ¼
¤
s0 > ¼s0 and ^ ¼
¤
s < ¼s for all s 6= s0;
(ii) among states with downward-biased subjective probabilities, states with larger price-
probability ratios (economy-wide stochastic discount factors) are biased down by larger fac-
7Equations (4) are Lambert W functions in ¼s=^ ¼s and in general no closed-form solution exists.
6tors: for s00, s0 2 fs : ^ ¼
¤
s < ¼sg, ¼s0=^ ¼
¤
s0 > ¼s00=^ ¼
¤
s00 i® ps0=¼s0 > ps00=¼s00 and ¼s0=^ ¼
¤
s0 = ¼s00=^ ¼
¤
s00
i® ps0=¼s0 = ps00=¼s00.
The result that the investor biases upward the probability of only one state comes from
a natural complementarity between the subjective belief about a state and the level of con-
sumption in that state. Once a state is perceived as more likely, one wants more consumption
in that state, and once one has more consumption in that state, there are greater bene¯ts to
believing that that state is more likely. The second part of the proposition is driven by the
same force. An investor purchases less consumption in a more expensive state, and so has a
greater incentive to believe that the more expensive state is unlikely to occur.
For the remainder of this section, we rule out the knife-edge case that delivers rational
expectations.
Assumption 1: Either S > 2 or ¼s 6= 1=2 or p1 6= p2.
We now characterize which state an investor is optimistic about. The bene¯ts of optimism
about a state are related to the consumption purchased in that state and the costs are related
to the objective misallocation of consumption across states. The costs are second-order, so
for an in¯nitesimal change in beliefs a person should bias upwards the probability of the
state in which they have the most consumption. Starting from objective beliefs, this is the
cheapest state in terms of price-probability ratio.
Analogously, optimal expectations, which are not in¯nitesimal deviations from rational
expectations, tend to bias upward the probability of the cheapest state because extra con-
sumption in that state requires the least decrease in consumption in the remaining states,
where `cheap' refers to a combination of low price and low ratio of price to probability. If all
states have the same ratio of price to probability, the investor biases upwards the probability
of the lowest price (and probability) state. If states have equal objective probabilities but
vary in price, then the investor overestimates the probability of the least-expensive state
7because this requires the smallest reduction in consumption in the other states.8
Proposition 3: (i) If all states have the same price-probability ratio, ps=¼s = m for all s,
the investor overestimates the probability of (one of) the state(s) with the lowest probability.
(ii) If all states are equally likely, ¼s = ¼ for all s, then the investor overestimates the
probability of (one of) the state(s) with the lowest price-probability ratio.
(iii) If one state has both the lowest probability and the lowest price-probability ratio,
then the investor overestimates the probability of this state.
(iv) For any state, there exist ¹ m and m, such that for a su±ciently low price ps · m¼s
optimal beliefs overestimate the probability of this state, ^ ¼
¤
s > ¼s, and for a su±ciently high
price ps ¸ ¹ m¼s optimal beliefs underestimate the probability of this state, ^ ¼
¤
s < ¼s.
The labels of `optimism' and `pessimism' in Figure I.1 denote the actual optimal beliefs
when states have equal probability: the state with the lowest price per unit of probability
is viewed with optimism and the remaining states are viewed with pessimism (Proposition
3(ii)). Figure I.2, discussed subsequently, displays the ¯rst-order conditions when states are
priced fairly.
Optimal portfolio choice. While beliefs are interesting, our ultimate interest is in
explaining prices and quantities, that is, returns and portfolios.
Consider ¯rst the case of actuarially fair prices, ps=¼s = m for all s. Under rational
expectations, the optimal portfolio is risk-free. For optimal beliefs, Equations (2) and (4)
imply ¯rst-order conditions 1=mcs + lnmcs = ¹ ¡ 1 + lnm for all s, where the Lagrange
multiplier ¹ is such that ¹ c¼s0 + c
P
s6=s0 ¼s = 1=m and (c;¹ c) are the two solutions to this
equation: ¹ c is the consumption level in the state with positively-biased subjective probability,
and c is the consumption level in the remaining states. This can be seen in Figure I.2,
which displays the ¯rst-order conditions when prices are actuarially fair. Because the right-
8Other e®ects are present { the elasticity of consumption to beliefs, and the curvature of the utility
function matter { but this is the strongest e®ect here.
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Figure I.2: First-order conditions when states are priced fairly
hand-sides are identical, all pessimistic biases are identical. The following corollaries follow
directly.
Corollary 1: (Preference for skewness) If ps=¼s = m for all s, then the investor prefers
the most skewed assets: the investor buys ¹ c of one of the Arrow-Debreu securities that pays
o® with the smallest probability and c < ¹ c of each of the remaining securities.
Corollary 2: (Two-fund separation) If ps=¼s = m for all s, then the investor holds a
portfolio consisting of the risk-free asset (an equal amount of all Arrow-Debreu securities)
and an additional positive amount of one and only one of the most skewed securities.
These Corollaries match two of the empirical ¯ndings described at the start of the paper.
First, investors are well diversi¯ed except for investing in one asset. Second, both the return
on the additional asset they hold and the return on their portfolios are positively skewed.
When prices are not actuarially fair, investors still do not optimally diversify and invest
more than the investor with rational expectations in securities with skewed returns. The
9latter occurs both because investors tend to be optimistic about states with low probabil-
ities and prices (Proposition 3) and because pessimism is more severe for states with high
prices (Proposition 2(ii)). In general, diversi¯cation, preferred by an agent with rational
expectations, would destroy skewness, preferred by an agent with optimal expectations.
As we now show, equilibrium prices tend to make di®erent investors optimistic about
di®erent states, and so portfolios in equilibrium tend to be heterogeneous and have idiosyn-
cratically skewed returns.
II. Asset pricing in an exchange economy with optimal expectations
We consider an exchange economy with a unit mass of investors, S > 2, and aggregate per
capita endowment in each state of Cs. Due to space constraints, we consider an example
that illustrates the general characteristics of optimal expectations equilibria. In this economy,
portfolios are heterogeneous across investors, portfolio returns are idiosyncratically skewed,
and securities with positively skewed returns have lower expected returns.
De¯nition: An optimal expectations equilibrium is a portfolio ci and beliefs ^ ¼
i for each
agent i and prices p such that: (i) each agent's portfolio is optimal given his beliefs and
prices; (ii) each agent's beliefs maximize his well-being; (iii) the market for each asset clears.
Before analyzing a more complex environment, consider ¯rst an economy with equally
probable states, ¼s = ¼, and no aggregate risk, Cs = C = 1. Suppose that prices are
actuarially fair, ps = p. Each investor biases upward the subjective probability of one state,
purchases ¹ c of the Arrow-Debreu security associated with this state, and purchases c < ¹ c of
the Arrow-Debreu security associated with the remaining downwards-biased states (where
¹ c and c are as de¯ned in the previous section). This is an equilibrium if an equal share
of agents are optimistic about each state, so that demand for consumption is equal across
states, and each asset's price is p = 1=S. This equilibrium is locally stable, in the sense that
a small change in prices would lead all investors to bias up the subjective probabilities of
10the cheapest states (Proposition 3(ii)), which would lead to excess demand for consumption
in these states and a (relative) increase in price for the cheapest states.
Consider now similar economies in which the variation in the aggregate endowment across
states is `not too large.' An equilibrium with actuarially fair prices exists as long as there exist
di®erent shares of agents that are optimistic about each state so that the demand for each
asset matches the supply. Thus, in economies with equally probable states and low aggregate
risk, prices are fair and agents hold heterogeneous beliefs, overinvest in di®erent skewed
assets, and thus hold portfolios with idiosyncratically skewed returns. In the corresponding
rational expectations equilibrium, investors' portfolios would be homogeneous and perfectly
diversi¯ed, cs = Cs. Further, also unlike in the rational expectations equilibrium, aggregate
risk, in limited amounts, is not priced.9 People have an interest in risk, and a small amount of
aggregate risk satis¯es this desire without changing prices. Finally, as aggregate endowment
risk increases beliefs become less heterogeneous.
Proposition 4: (Heterogenous portfolios and idiosyncratic skewness) Suppose that
¼s = ¼ for all s. For any vector (C1;:::;CS) of aggregate endowment such that c · Cs · ¹ c
and
PS
s=1 Cs = ¹ c + (S ¡ 1)c, there exists an optimal expectations equilibrium with the
following characteristics:
(i) prices are actuarially fair: ps = p for all s;
(ii) for all s; a fraction ¸s = (Cs¡ c)=(¹ c ¡ c) of investors buys ¹ c of the Arrow-Debreu
security associated to state s and c of the security for every other state;
where c and ¹ c are de¯ned in Section I.
Having established this result, we now construct our example that matches all three styl-
ized facts discussed in the introduction. Consider an economy with some unlikely states and
some likely states. At actuarially fair prices, each investor would bias upward his probability
9The equality of probabilities across states is key for this results. With unequal probabilities, aggregate
risk is typically priced.
11of one of the unlikely states. Analogously to Proposition 4, this is an equilibrium if there
exists shares of investors that are optimistic about each unlikely state such that the market
clears. For example, if ¼s = ¼A and Cs = CA := 1
s¹ c+
³
1 ¡ 1
s
´
c for s · s and ¼s = ¼B > ¼A
and Cs = CB := c for s > s, then an equilibrium with fair prices exists in which 1=s investors
bias up their probabilities for states s · s. But if the endowments across states are not so
di®erent, then prices in the unlikely states must be relatively higher so that demand for
output is also relatively lower in these states, and hence the expected returns of the most
skewed Arrow-Debreu securities are lower.
Proposition 5: (Underperformance of skewed assets) For a small reduction in CA¡
CB such that ps does not change for s > s, ps increases for s · s so that:
(i) the securities with the more skewed returns have lower expected returns than in a
rational expectations equilibrium;
(ii) the securities with the more skewed returns have relatively lower expected returns,
¼A=ps < ¼B=ps0 for all s · s and s0 > s.
This equilibrium ¯ts all three stylized facts: (a) portfolios are heterogeneous and not
perfectly diversi¯ed; (b) each investor overinvests in one security that is more skewed than
the average security and his portfolio return is more skewed than the market return; (c) more
positively skewed securities have lower returns. These results relate to the use of co-skewness
as a pricing factor. As CA varies (and in richer environments), the relative importance of
idiosyncratic skewness and aggregate skewness for asset prices varies. Finally, consumption
insurance appears incomplete, but not because of missing markets or moral hazard, but
rather because households optimally choose to hold risk.
How important are the assumptions of our example? First, if the low-probability states
have much larger endowments than the other states (Cs > CA), then we still match (a) and
(b), but the expected returns on the most skewed assets are higher for the usual reason that
investors discount payouts in states with high aggregate endowment. However, even in this
12case, Proposition 5(i) implies that the returns on the most skewed assets are lower than in a
rational expectations equilibrium. Second, the assumption that some probabilities are equal
is not essential. If probabilities di®er among high-probability states, nothing changes. If
probabilities di®er among low-probability states, prices would have to be higher for lower
probability states for investors to remain indi®erent among (perhaps a subset) of states and
for portfolios to be heterogeneous.
The desire for skewness can also impact the market return. If bad aggregate states have
low probabilities, as for disasters or Peso problems, then it is possible for the desire for
skewness to increase the equity premium, as investors seek to avoid negative skewness.
In conclusion, the natural human tendency towards optimism tempered by the real costs
of poor decisions, implies that people hold heterogeneous, underdiversi¯ed portfolios to attain
skewed returns, and that this behavior reduces the returns of positively skewed assets.
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15Appendix: Proofs
A. Proof of Proposition 1
De¯ne the set ¦ =
n
^ ¼ : 0 · ^ ¼s · 1;
PS
s=1 ^ ¼s = 1
o
. Optimal consumption choices given be-
liefs are continuous in probabilities on ¦ (Equation (2)). The objective for beliefs (Equation
(3)) is thus continuous in beliefs on ¦ since L is linear in ^ ¼ and continuous in c. Since ¦
is compact, a maximum exists on ¦. To see that the optimum requires 0 < ^ ¼s < 1 for all
s, note that for ^ ¼ such that ^ ¼s = 0 for at least one s, c¤
s = 0, and thus the objective for
beliefs has value negative in¯nity and this cannot be optimal since the objective is ¯nite on
the interior of ¦.¥
B. Proof of Proposition 2
To establish the results, we ¯rst prove four lemmas. Without loss of generality, we choose
units so that
S X
s=1
ps = 1:
This implies that ps=¼s = m = 1 for all s for actuarially fair prices.
Lemma 1: The subjective belief of at most one state is biased upwards.
Proof of Lemma 1: The second-order condition, Equation (5), implies
^ ¼
2
s [^ ¼s0 ¡ ¼s0] · ^ ¼
2
s0 [¼s ¡ ^ ¼s] for all s 6= s
0. (B.1)
Thus if beliefs about the likelihood of s0 are biased upwards, so that ^ ¼s0 ¡ ¼s0 > 0, then
^ ¼s ¡ ¼s < 0 for all s 6= s0.¥
The proof of Lemma 1 also directly implies Lemma 2.
16Lemma 2: If the subjective belief of one state is biased upwards, then the subjective
beliefs of all other states are biased downwards.
Lemma 2 corresponds to result (i) in Proposition 2, except that we still need to prove that
rational expectation cannot be optimal except in the case in which prices are actuarially fair,
probabilities are equal, and there are only two states. We ¯rst examine the case of actuarially
unfair prices.
Lemma 3: If prices are not actuarially fair, rational expectations cannot be optimal.
Proof of Lemma 3: The ¯rst-order conditions (4) for rational expectations are
1 = ¹ ¡ 1 + ln
ps
¼s
for all s
which cannot be satis¯ed for all s if ps=¼s 6= ps0=¼s0 for some s and s0.¥
Combining lemmata 2 and 3 implies that there is one, and only one, state whose proba-
bility is biased upwards when prices are actuarially unfair. In the remaining proof of result
(i), we assume that prices are actuarially fair.
Lemma 4: If prices are actuarially fair, ps=¼s = 1 for all s, then the investor biases his
beliefs for all states with downward-biased subjective probabilities by a common factor: For
one state, s0, cs0 = ¹ c ¸ 1 and ^ ¼s0 = ¹ c¼s0 ¸ ¼s0, and for all other states, s 6= s0, cs = c · 1 and
^ ¼s = c¼s · ¼s, where (c;¹ c) are the two solutions to
1
c
¡ ln
1
c
= ¹ ¡ 1 (B.2)
with ¹ such that ¹ c¼s0 + c
P
s6=s0 ¼s = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4: Equation (B.2) is the ¯rst-order conditions for optimal beliefs written
in terms of consumption using Equation (2). If ¹ = 2, cs = 1 for all states, in which case
beliefs are objective and the Lemma holds trivially (c = ¹ c). If ¹ > 2, every ¯rst-order
condition has the same two possible solution, so that cs = ^ ¼s=ps = ^ ¼s=¼s is the same among
17all states whose likelihood is biased down. For these states let c := c¤
s (^ ¼). Then Lemma
1 implies that there is at most one state perceived as more likely than it is, and let its
consumption level be ¹ c. We note ¹ < 2 is not possible by Proposition 1.¥
We now prove that the one speci¯c case has rational expectations and part (i) for actu-
arially fair prices by using these Lemmas to analyze the program given by Equation (3).
Let ¼ denote the probability of the state whose probability is biased upwards, and let
c be the consumption level in that state, which is denoted s0. By Lemma 3, we know that
the consumption level is a constant c in all other states. Using the fact that b ¼ = c¼, we can
rewrite the Lagrangian objective for beliefs as a function of only ¹ c and ¼:
L =
PS
s=1 cs¼s lncs +
PS
s=1 ¼s lncs ¡ ¹
"
S X
s=1
cs¼s ¡ 1
#
= ¼¹ cln¹ c + (1 ¡ ¼)clnc + ¼ ln¹ c + (1 ¡ ¼)lnc ¡ ¹[¹ c¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)c ¡ 1]
= ¼ (¹ c + 1)ln¹ c + (2 ¡ ¼ (¹ c + 1))ln
µ
1 ¡ ¼¹ c
1 ¡ ¼
¶
:= U (¹ c;¼)
where the last step imposes the constraint by substituting in c = 1¡¼¹ c
1¡¼ . U (¹ c;¼) is maximized
over the choice of state to bias upward and consumption level in that state. We proceed in
two steps.
Suppose that we know the state, and thus its objective probability ¼, whose belief is
biased upwards. We determine the optimal bias c in the following way. Notice ¯rst that
U(1;¼) = 0 and that
@U
@¹ c
(¹ c;¼) = ¼ ln
¹ c(1 ¡ ¼)
1 ¡ ¼¹ c
+ ¼
1 ¡ ¹ c
¹ c(1 ¡ ¼¹ c)
:
Evaluating U¹ c at ¹ c = 1 and ¹ c = (1 ¡ ¼)=¼, we obtain that
@U
@¹ c
(1;¼) = 0;
18and
@U
@¹ c
(
1 ¡ ¼
¼
;¼) = 2¼ ln
1 ¡ ¼
¼
+
2¼ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¼
:
The second derivative of U with respect to ¹ c is:
@2U
@¹ c2 (¹ c;¼) = ¡2¼
2(¹ c ¡ 1)(¹ c ¡ 1
2¼)
¹ c2(1 ¡ ¼¹ c)2 : (B.3)
When ¼ = 1=2; the right-hand side of the above equality is negative, implying that U is
concave in ¹ c. Combining this with U¹ c(1;1=2) = 0 directly implies that ¹ c = 1 (and so b ¼ = ¼) is
optimal if ¼ = 1=2. This sheds light on the special case with only two states that are equally
likely. In that case, the choice of the state whose probability would be biased upwards is
arbitrary, and we have just shown that it is optimal not to distort beliefs. We now argue
that in all other cases, ^ ¼ 6= ¼.
First, we show that if we consider ¼ < 1=2, then ¹ c > 1=2¼ so that ^ ¼ > 1=2 > ¼. When ¼ is
less than 1=2; we see from (B.3) that U is alternatively concave, convex and concave (in ¹ c) over
the intervals ]0;1]; [1;1=2¼] and [1=2¼;1=¼]. Combining this with U(1;1=2) = U¹ c(1;1=2) = 0
implies that the optimal solution has a ¹ c larger than 1=2¼.
Second, we show that given ¼, the optimal ¹ c has ¹ c · (1 ¡ ¼)=¼; or equivalently that
b ¼ · 1 ¡ ¼. This follows from
q(¼) =
@U
@¹ c
(
1 ¡ ¼
¼
;¼) = 2¼ ln
1 ¡ ¼
¼
+
2¼ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¼
being negative when ¼ is less than 1=2.10 This implies that ¹ c · (1 ¡ ¼)=¼ or ^ ¼ · 1¡¼ which
10This is because q(1=2) = 0; and
q0(¼) = 2ln
1 ¡ ¼
¼
+
2¼ ¡ 1
(1 ¡ ¼)2;
q00(¼) =
2(2¼ ¡ 1)
¼(1 ¡ ¼)3;
so that q0(1=2) = 0 and q00 has the same sign than ¼¡0:5. This implies that q has the same sign than ¼¡0:5:
19implies that the state perceived as more likely than it is necessarily has ¼ · 1=2. Combined
with the ¯rst result, we know that if the optimal ¼ 6= 1=2, we have ^ ¼s 6= ¼s for all s (\for all
s" follows from Lemma 2).
What we still need to show is that ¼ 6= 1=2 when there are more than 2 states with one
state having probability 1=2. We do this by showing that the function V (¼) = max¹ c U(¹ c;¼)
is symmetric and U-shaped with a minimum at 1=2. Thus, as long as there exists a state with
probability di®erent from 1=2, ^ ¼ 6= ¼. V is symmetric around ¼ = 1=2 from the de¯nition
of V . By the envelop theorem, we have that
V
0(¼) =
¼
¡
¹ c ¡ 1¡¼
¼
¢
(1 ¡ ¹ c)2
¹ c(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ ¼¹ c)
;
where ¹ c maximizes U (¹ c;¼). Suppose that ¼ is less than 1=2. We have seen above that it
implies that ¹ c is larger than 1=2 but smaller (1 ¡ ¼)=¼, yielding V 0(¼) < 0. This shows
that the optimal state to bias upwards is the objectively least likely one. Except the case
¼1 = ¼2 = 1=2, this state has a ¼ less than 1=2; which implies that c < 1 < c. This concludes
the proof of result (i) in Proposition 2.
The above proof also directly implies Lemma 5, used in the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 5: If prices are actuarially fair, ps=¼s = 1 for all s, then ^ ¼s0 ¸ 1=2 where s0 is the
state whose probability is biased upwards.
Proposition 2(ii) follows directly from the ¯rst-order conditions, Equation (4). Given
that one selects the solution with ¼s=^ ¼s > 1, the left-hand side is increasing in ¼s=^ ¼s and
the right-hand side is increasing in price-probability ratio, ps=¼s.¥
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 2 implies the pattern of belief distortion but does not specify which is the state
that has its probability biased upwards.
20The proof of part (i) relies on the function V (¼) de¯ned in the proof of Proposition 2(i)
as the value of holding beliefs that are optimistic about state s0 where ¼ is the probability
associated with this state. The proof of Proposition 2(i) shows that this function, V (¼), is
symmetric and U-shaped with a minimum at 1=2. Further, the proof of Proposition 2(i)
shows that the optimal s0 is necessarily such that ¼ · 1=2. Thus, V (¼) is maximized by
choosing to bias upwards the probability of (one of) the smallest probability state(s).
To prove part (ii), we show that the local maximum in which subjective probabilities
satisfy the ¯rst-order conditions and the budget constraint with an arbitrary optimistic state
is dominated by the same set of subjective probabilities in which the subjective probability
of this state and the cheapest state are interchanged.
Let states 1 to ¹ s be the least expensive states, ps = ps0 < ps00 for s0;s · ¹ s and s00 > ¹ s. Let
^ ¼
¤ (s00) denote the vector of subjective probabilities that satisfy the ¯rst-order conditions,
sum to one, and have ^ ¼s00 > ¼s00 and ^ ¼s < ¼s for all s 6= s00 and let L(^ ¼
¤ (s00);p) denote the
associated value of the objective for beliefs:
L(^ ¼
¤ (s
00);p) :=
PS
s=1 ^ ¼
¤
s (s
00)ln
µ
^ ¼
¤
s (s00)
ps
¶
+
PS
s=1 ¼s ln
µ
^ ¼
¤
s (s00)
ps
¶
where p denotes the vector of prices.
Consider taking ^ ¼
¤ (s00) for some s00 > ¹ s and switching the subjective probability for state
s00 (^ ¼
¤
s0 (s00)) with the subjective probability of some state s0 · ¹ s (^ ¼
¤
s0 (s00)),
(^ ¼
¤
1 (s
00);:::; ^ ¼
¤
s00 (s
00);:::; ^ ¼
¤
¹ s (s
00);:::; ^ ¼
¤
s0 (s
00);::^ ¼
¤
S (s
00)) := ^ ¼
Switch (s
00)
This is feasible because it is still the case that probabilities sum to one and as a result the
budget constraint is also satis¯ed. For notational simplicity, for the moment, let ^ ¼
¤
s = ^ ¼
¤
s (s00).
21Since well-being di®ers only in states s0 and s00,
L
¡
^ ¼
Switch (s
00);p
¢
¡ L(^ ¼
¤ (s
00);p) = (^ ¼
¤
s00 + ¼)ln
^ ¼
¤
s00
ps0
¡ (^ ¼
¤
s0 + ¼)ln
^ ¼
¤
s0
ps0
+(^ ¼
¤
s0 + ¼)ln
^ ¼
¤
s0
ps00
¡ (^ ¼
¤
s00 + ¼)ln
^ ¼
¤
s00
ps00
= (^ ¼
¤
s00 ¡ ^ ¼
¤
s0)ln
ps00
ps0
> 0
where the sign follows from the initial assumptions that ps0 < ps00 and that optimism is
focussed on state s0 so that ^ ¼
¤
s00 (s00) > ¼ > ^ ¼
¤
s0 (s00).
Since ^ ¼
Switch (s00) is not optimally chosen for the situation in which the investor biases
upward his beliefs about state s0, these probabilities may not satisfy the ¯rst-order conditions
and so are weakly worse than those that are optimally chosen conditional on being optimistic
about state s0:
L(^ ¼
¤ (s
0);p) ¸ L
¡
^ ¼
Switch (s
00);p
¢
Thus we have,
L(^ ¼
¤ (s
0);p) ¸ L
¡
^ ¼
Switch (s
00);p
¢
> L(^ ¼
¤ (s
00);p) for all s
00 > ¹ s and s
0 · ¹ s
which completes the proof of part (ii).
For part (iii), we make a similar argument. Let states 1to ¹ s be the least expensive and
lowest probability states, ps = ps0 < ps00 and ¼s = ¼s0 < ¼s00 for s0;s · ¹ s and s00 > ¹ s. Consider
taking ^ ¼
¤ (s00) for some s00 > ¹ s and switching the subjective probability for state s00 (^ ¼
¤
s0 (s00))
with the subjective probability of some state s0 · ¹ s (^ ¼
¤
s0 (s00)) and let this vector be denoted
22^ ¼
Switch (s00). Since well-being di®ers only in states s0 and s00,
L
¡
^ ¼
Switch (s
00);p
¢
¡ L(^ ¼
¤ (s
00);p) = (^ ¼
¤
s00 + ¼s00)ln
^ ¼
¤
s00
ps0
¡ (^ ¼
¤
s0 + ¼s0)ln
^ ¼
¤
s0
ps0
+(^ ¼
¤
s0 + ¼s0)ln
^ ¼
¤
s0
ps00
¡ (^ ¼
¤
s00 + ¼s00)ln
^ ¼
¤
s00
ps00
= (^ ¼
¤
s00 ¡ ^ ¼
¤
s0)ln
ps00
ps0
+ (¼s00 ¡ ¼s0)ln
ps00
ps0
where the sign follows from the initial assumptions that ¼s00 > ¼s0, ps0 < ps00 and that
optimism is focussed on state s0 so that ^ ¼
¤
s00 (s00) > ¼ > ^ ¼
¤
s0 (s00).
Analogously to part (ii), since ^ ¼
Switch (s00) is not optimally chosen for the situation in
which the investor biases upward his beliefs about state s0:
L(^ ¼
¤ (s
0);p) ¸ L
¡
^ ¼
Switch (s
00);p
¢
Thus we have,
L(^ ¼
¤ (s
0);p) ¸ L
¡
^ ¼
Switch (s
00);p
¢
> L(^ ¼
¤ (s
00);p) for all s
00 > ¹ s and s
0 · ¹ s
which completes the proof of part (iii).
For part (iv) of Proposition 3, we ¯rst note that, for any problem, there is a lower bound
placed on ¹ by the requirement of real solutions to the ¯rst-order conditions (Proposition
1). Thus,
¹ ¸ ¹ := max
s
½
2 ¡ ln
ps
¼s
¾
(C.1)
Second, for any problem, there is an upper bound placed on ¹ by the requirement that the
^ ¼s0 < 1 in the solution to the ¯rst-order condition for the probability that is positively-biased
state. Thus, for state s0 to have ^ ¼s0 > ¼s0, we require
¹ < ¹ ¹(s
0) := 1 + ¼s0 ¡ lnps0.
23Consider ¯rst m. As one decreases ps0, ¹ increases (at least once ps0=¼s0 is the minimum),
¹ ¹(s0) increases, and ¹ ¹(s) for s 6= s0 does not change. Thus, there is an ms0 such that for
ps0 = ms0¼s0, ¹ ¹(s0) > ¹ and ¹ ¹(s0) < ¹ for all s 6= s0. Thus, the agent must be optimistic
about state s0. Then m = mins0 fms0g.
In terms of ¹ m, as one increases ps0, there is an ¹ m such that for ps0 = ¹ m¼s, ¹ ¹(s0) < ¹
and ¹ ¹(s0) > ¹ for some s 6= s0. Thus, the agent must be pessimistic about state s0. Then ¹ m
= maxs0 f¹ ms0g.¥
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof by construction in the text.
E. Proof of Proposition 5
This Proposition is not trivial because, while an increase in the price of a given state decreases
the demand for the asset that pays o® in that state, an increase in the price of a state for
which ^ ¼
¤
s < ¼s decreases the demands for the assets that pay o® in all other states that are
viewed with pessimism. Following the proof of Proposition 5, we prove two Lemmata that
characterize these price e®ects in Section F.
We start with the following Lemma.
Lemma 6: In any equilibrium with actuarially fair prices:
S X
s=1
µ
^ ¼
2
s
^ ¼s ¡ ¼s
¶
> 0. (E.1)
or equivalently
¼s0
µ
¹ c2
¹ c ¡ 1
¶
+
X
s6=s0
¼s
µ
c2
c ¡ 1
¶
> 0 (E.2)
Proof: By Lemma 4, there are two consumption levels such that ^ ¼s=¼s = c for all s 6= s0;
24and ^ ¼s0=¼s0 = ¹ c. Since subjective probabilities sum to one,
P
s6=s0 ^ ¼s = 1 ¡ ^ ¼s0, and the
budget constraint at fair prices implies
1 = ¹ c¼s0 +
X
s6=s0
c¼s
c =
1 ¡ ¼s0¹ c
1 ¡ ¼s0
c =
1 ¡ ^ ¼s0
1 ¡ ¼s0
:
Using these relationships, our term of interest becomes:
S X
s=1
^ ¼
2
s
^ ¼s ¡ ¼s
=
^ ¼s0
1 ¡
¼s0
^ ¼s0
+
X
s6=s0
^ ¼s
µ
1
1 ¡ c¡1
¶
=
^ ¼
2
s0
^ ¼s0 ¡ ¼s0
+ (1 ¡ ^ ¼s0)
1
1 ¡
1¡¼s0
1¡^ ¼s0
=
^ ¼
2
s0
^ ¼s0 ¡ ¼s0
+
(1 ¡ ^ ¼s0)
2
1 ¡ ^ ¼s0 ¡ 1 + ¼s0
=
2^ ¼s0 ¡ 1
(^ ¼s0 ¡ ¼s0)
which is positive if ^ ¼s0 > 1=2: This follows from from Lemma 5.¥
For notational simplicity, let a index the states s · s so that ¼s = ¼a and Cs = Ca for
s · s, and let b index the S ¡ s states with ¼s = ¼b and Cs = Cb. Let a0 be the state, less
than or equal to s, that is viewed as more likely than it is; this state di®ers across investors
but all a-states are symmetric so we can impose that pa0 = pa.
To prove Proposition 5, we write the conditions for the initial equilibrium with fair prices,
totally di®erentiate the system for a small increase in the aggregate endowment in the a-
states, dCa, imposing that dpb = 0, show that dpa > 0, and check that dCb < 0. Because
there is a discrete interval between ¼a and ¼b and because the wellbeing functions evaluated
for di®erent choices of s0(the state such that ^ ¼s > ¼s) are continuous in prices, small enough
changes in pa and pb do not change the relative rankings of the wellbeing as a function of s0.
25Thus, locally the pattern of a0 across investors remains unchanged.
E1. Equilibrium conditions at fair prices
The exogenous variables are S, s, ¼a. Given these three, ¼b is given by the fact that
probabilities sum to one
s¼a + (S ¡ s)¼b = 1:
For actuarially fair prices that (normalized) sum to one, we have
pa = ¼a
pb = ¼b:
Optimal beliefs are given by the investor ¯rst-order conditions,
¼a0
^ ¼a0
¡ ln
¼a0
^ ¼a0
= ¹ ¡ 1 + ln
pa
¼a
(E.3)
¼a
^ ¼a
¡ ln
¼a
^ ¼a
= ¹ ¡ 1 + ln
pa
¼a
for a 6= a
0
¼b
^ ¼b
¡ ln
¼b
^ ¼b
= ¹ ¡ 1 + ln
pb
¼b
(note that at fair prices, the last two imply and ¼a
^ ¼a =
¼b
^ ¼b), and the fact that subjective
probabilities sum to one,
^ ¼a0 + (s ¡ 1) ^ ¼a + (S ¡ s) ^ ¼b = 1. (E.4)
These equations can be used to solve for ^ ¼a0, ^ ¼a, ^ ¼b and ¹, which we know exist and are
unique. Note that c = ^ ¼a
¼a =
^ ¼b
¼b and ¹ c =
^ ¼a0
¼a0.
Finally, the two remaining exogenous variables that deliver fair prices in equilibrium, Ca
26and Cb, are calculated from market clearing conditions:
Ca =
1
s
^ ¼a0
pa
+
µ
1 ¡
1
s
¶
^ ¼a
pa
(E.5)
Cb =
^ ¼b
pb
.
We have three exogenous variables that are chosen to generate an initial fair-prices equi-
librium, ¼b, Ca, and Cb, six endogenous variables (¹, ^ ¼a0, ^ ¼b, ^ ¼a, pa, pb), and nine equations.
E2. Totally di®erentiated equilibrium conditions
We totally di®erentiate the system (E.3), (E.4), and (E.5) allowing Ca and Cb to vary and
imposing dpb = 0:
^ ¼a0 ¡ ¼a0
^ ¼
2
a0
d^ ¼a0 = d¹ +
1
pa
dpa
^ ¼a ¡ ¼a
^ ¼
2
a
d^ ¼a = d¹ +
1
pa
dpa for a 6= a
0
^ ¼b ¡ ¼b
^ ¼
2
b
d^ ¼b = d¹ + 0 (E.6)
d^ ¼a0 + (s ¡ 1)d^ ¼a + (S ¡ s)d^ ¼b = 0
p
2
adCa =
1
s
(pad^ ¼a0 ¡ ^ ¼a0dpa) +
µ
1 ¡
1
s
¶
(pad^ ¼a ¡ ^ ¼adpa)
dCb =
d^ ¼b
pb
¡ 0 (E.7)
Now we want to study dpa, dCb, and dCb around an equilibrium with fair prices, i.e., with
pa
¼a =
pb
¼b = 1.
27E3. Signing dpa, dCa and dCb around a fair price equilibrium
Set dCa = 1 (so that implicitly dx is dx=dCa), and re-write the equations using ¹ c =
^ ¼a0
¼a0 and
Cb =
^ ¼b
pb and replace prices with probabilities:
¹ c ¡ 1
¹ c2
1
¼a
d^ ¼a0 = d¹ +
1
¼a
dpa
Cb ¡ 1
C2
b
1
¼a
d^ ¼a = d¹ +
1
¼a
dpa for a 6= a
0
Cb ¡ 1
C2
b
1
¼b
d^ ¼b = d¹
d^ ¼a0 + (s ¡ 1)d^ ¼a + (S ¡ s)d^ ¼b = 0
1
s
(d^ ¼a0 ¡ ¹ cdpa) +
µ
1 ¡
1
s
¶
(d^ ¼a ¡ Cbdpa) = ¼a
pbdCb = d^ ¼b
Now using the ¯rst three equations (the ¯rst-order conditions) to eliminate beliefs in the
third-to-last and the second-to-last equations gives:
(¼a® + ¼b¯)d¹ + ®dpa = 0 (E.8)
®¼ad¹ +
µ
¹ c
¹ c ¡ 1
+ (s ¡ 1)
Cb
Cb ¡ 1
¶
dpa = s¼a
where
® =
¹ c2
¹ c ¡ 1
+ (s ¡ 1)
C2
b
Cb ¡ 1
¯ = (S ¡ s)
C2
b
Cb ¡ 1
Note that ¯ < 0 since Cb ¡1 = ^ ¼b=¼b ¡1. In the current notation, the inequality of Lemma
6 is
¼a
µ
¹ c2
¹ c ¡ 1
¶
+ (s ¡ 1)¼b
µ
c2
c ¡ 1
¶
+ (S ¡ s)¼b
µ
c2
c ¡ 1
¶
= ¼a® + ¼b¯ > 0
28Together these two inequalities imply that ® > 0. Thus d¹ and dpa have opposite signs.
Combining equations (E.8) gives
dpa =
s¼a
¹ c
¹ c¡1 + (s ¡ 1)
Cb
Cb¡1 ¡ ®2¼a
¼a®+¼b¯
To show that dpa < 0, we note that the numerator is positive and that
¹ c
¹ c ¡ 1
+ (s ¡ 1)
Cb
Cb ¡ 1
= ® ¡ ¹ c ¡ (s ¡ 1)Cb
so that the sign of the denominator is given by the sign of:
µ
¹ c
¹ c ¡ 1
+ (s ¡ 1)
Cb
Cb ¡ 1
¶
(¼a® + ¼b¯) ¡ ®
2¼a
= (® ¡ ¹ c ¡ (s ¡ 1)Cb)(¼a® + ¼b¯) ¡ ®
2¼a
= ¡¹ c(¼a® + ¼b¯) ¡ (s ¡ 1)Cb (¼a® + ¼b¯) + ¼b¯® < 0
From equation (E.8), we have that d¹ > 0, and from equations (E.6), we have that
d^ ¼b < 0, and so from equation (E.7), we have dCb < 0.
Thus, reversing signs, for a small reduction in aggregate risk { a decrease in Ca and an
increase in Cb { such that the expected returns on the less-skewed assets do not change,
dpb = 0, the expected returns on the more skewed assets rises, dpa < 0.¥
F. Lemmata on the e®ects of prices on demands
Lemma 7: (Law of demand for fair prices) For ¼s=ps = 1 for all s, c¤
s (^ ¼
¤ (p);p) =
c¤
s (^ ¼
¤
s (p);ps) is decreasing in ps.
Proof of Lemma 7: Let t be the (only) state for which price increases. If ^ ¼ > ¼ and
switches to ^ ¼ < ¼, then we have our result. Otherwise, using Equation (2), the change in
29portfolio for a small change in pt is
dct
dpt
=
1
pt
d^ ¼t
dpt
¡
^ ¼t
(pt)
2: (F.1)
We thus want to show that
d^ ¼t
dpt
<
^ ¼t
pt
.
Totally di®erentiating each ¯rst-order condition (Equations (4)), gives
d^ ¼t
dpt
=
µ
^ ¼
2
t
^ ¼t ¡ ¼t
¶µ
d¹
dpt
+
1
pt
¶
(F.2)
d^ ¼s
dpt
=
µ
^ ¼
2
s
^ ¼s ¡ ¼s
¶
d¹
dpt
for all s 6= t: (F.3)
Summing across all states and imposing that
PS
s=1 d¼s=dpt = 0 gives
d¹
dpt
= ¡
³
^ ¼2
t
^ ¼t¡¼t
´
PS
s=1
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
1
pt
which can be plugged into equation (F.2) to give
d^ ¼t
dpt
=
^ ¼t
pt
µ
^ ¼t
^ ¼t ¡ ¼t
¶
0
@1 ¡
³
^ ¼2
t
^ ¼t¡¼t
´
PS
s=1
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
1
A:
Thus, we have our result i®
1 >
µ
^ ¼t
^ ¼t ¡ ¼t
¶
0
@
P
s6=t
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
PS
s=1
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
1
A:
If ^ ¼t > ¼t, then
P
s6=t
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
< 0, and our result follows if
S X
s=1
Ã
^ ¼s
1 ¡ ¼s
^ ¼s
!
> 0
30which is true by Lemma 6.
If ^ ¼t < ¼t, then our result also follows if this inequality is satis¯ed because that implies
P
s6=t
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
> 0.¥
Lemma 8: (Cross-price e®ects for fair prices) For ¼s=ps = 1 for all s and t such that
t 6= s , c¤
s (^ ¼
¤
s (p);ps) is increasing in pt if ^ ¼
¤
s > ¼s or ^ ¼
¤
t > ¼t, otherwise it is decreasing in pt
as long as it remains true that ^ ¼
¤
s < ¼s.
Proof of Lemma 8: If the investor switches to become optimistic about state s as we
increase the price of the state previously viewed with optimism, then we have our result.
Increasing the price of another state cannot cause the investor to switch their optimism from
the state viewed with optimism.
So under the assumption that the investor remains optimistic about the same state, using
Equation (2), for any s 6= t, the change in portfolio for a small change in pt is
dcs
dpt
=
1
ps
d^ ¼s
dpt
:
We thus the sign of dcs
dpt is the same as that of d^ ¼s
dpt > 0.
Totally di®erentiating each ¯rst-order condition (equations (4)), gives
d^ ¼t
dpt
=
µ
^ ¼
2
t
^ ¼t ¡ ¼t
¶µ
d¹
dpt
+
1
pt
¶
d^ ¼s
dpt
=
µ
^ ¼
2
s
^ ¼s ¡ ¼s
¶
d¹
dpt
for all s 6= t: (F.4)
Summing across all states and imposing that
PS
s=1 d¼s=dpt = 0 gives
d¹
dpt
= ¡
³
^ ¼2
t
^ ¼t¡¼t
´
PS
s=1
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
1
pt
31which can be plugged into equation (F.4) to give
d^ ¼s
dpt
= ¡
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´³
^ ¼2
t
^ ¼t¡¼t
´
PS
s=1
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
1
pt
:
From Lemma 6, we have that
PS
s=1
³
^ ¼2
s
^ ¼s¡¼s
´
> 0, thus d^ ¼s
dpt > 0 if ^ ¼s > ¼s or ^ ¼t > ¼t otherwise
it is negative.¥
32